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WebKeyDAO: The Arbitrage & Access Control Logic Exploit (March 2025)

On March 14, 2025, WebKeyDAO, a launcher platform operating on the BNB Chain, was exploited for approximately $737,000. While the immediate financial impact was relatively moderate for the year, this exploit has become an industry-standard benchmark for AI-driven vulnerability detection and the dangers of combining Oracle-less pricing with unprotected administrative setters.

Technical Overview​

The vulnerability centered on the protocol's token sale vault. The architecture relied on an internal "fixed price" model intended to be maintained by protocol admins. The core flaws were:

  1. Access Control Failure: The SetSaleInfo() function, responsible for updating the token price and sale parameters, was either poorly permissioned or misconfigured during deployment.
  2. Oracle-less Pricing: The buy() function sold tokens based on a static price stored in contract state rather than utilizing a dynamic, reliable price oracle (e.g., Chainlink).

Exploit Mechanism: The In-to-Out Arbitrage​

The attacker (or a high-reasoning agent) leveraged the mismatch between internal contract state and external market liquidity.

  1. Parameter Injection: The attacker called the unprotected or misconfigured SetSaleInfo() function to set the token purchase price within the contract to an abnormally low value.
  2. The "Buy" Phase: Using the newly injected "garbage" price, the attacker utilized the buy() function to acquire a large volume of wkeyDao tokens for a fraction of their market value.
  3. The Liquidation Phase: Immediately following the purchase, the attacker swapped the undervalued tokens on external Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) where the market price was significantly higher.
  4. Atomic Arbitrage: The entire sequence—manipulation, purchase, and swap—was performed in a single block, effectively draining the protocol's liquidity reserves.

Wider Significance: The AI Benchmark​

WebKeyDAO gained industry notoriety when Anthropic researchers used it to benchmark Claude 3.5 Sonnet (Extended Thinking). In a controlled test, the model was able to:

  • Identify the lack of authorization on the SetSaleInfo() setter from raw bytecode.
  • Recognize that the buy() function utilized a static price decoupled from external market reality.
  • Draft and execute a functional exploit script autonomously.

Mitigation Strategies​

  • Decentralized Price Oracles: Never rely on manual price updates for tokens with an active secondary market. Use Chainlink or Pyth to ensure internal prices track fair market value.
  • Standardized Access Modifiers: Implement OpenZeppelin AccessControl or Ownable modifiers strictly. Setter functions for economic parameters must be behind a Multi-Signature Wallet and ideally a Timelock.
  • Automatic Circuit Breakers: Implement rate-limits on sales and sanity checks that revert transactions if the internal price deviates from a trusted external source by more than a set threshold (e.g., 10%).
  • Stateful Fuzzing: Protocols should utilize automated fuzzing tools to detect "Abnormal Profit" paths where a single user can extract a significant percentage of TVL via parameter manipulation.

Conclusion​

The WebKeyDAO heist is a sobering reminder that simple logic is the softest target for automation. In an era where AI agents can scan the blockchain for unprotected function pointers and pricing discrepancies in seconds, relying on manual parameter management is no longer a viable security model.